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Abstract 
The topic of financial crises is popular in the financial literature and among regulators. Previous 
researchers have studied the causes of financial crises and have investigated the regulation 
responses in the aftermath of the 2008/2009 global crises. However, no one has yet focused on 
how much existing regulations or country-level governance affect the probability of financial 
crises occurring. This paper explores this important yet understudied topic. We also compare the 
differential effects of governance has on different economies, specifically, developed versus 
developing countries. Our empirical results suggest that the same factor can have opposite effects 











I am greatly indebted to my supervisor, Dr. Thomas Walker, for his continuous support of my 
research. I could never finish my thesis without his valuable instructions, and he is the best 
supervisor I could imagine.  
 
Special thanks go to Dr. Kuntara Pukthuanthong from the University of Missouri. She has been 
highly supportive throughout my thesis work, and she always provided me with timely help and 
useful information. I am also very grateful to my committee members, Dr. Fredrick Davis and Dr. 
Tingyu Zhou from Concordia University for their insightful suggestions to complete my thesis.  
 
Last but not the least, I thank to all my family members and friends, and especially my parents. 
Their encouragement and unconditional support have enabled me to finish the M.Sc. program.
 v 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
1. Introduction .............................................................................................................................1 
2. Literature Review ....................................................................................................................3 
3. Data and Descriptive Statistics ................................................................................................6 
3.1 Data ...............................................................................................................................6 
3.2 Descriptive Statistics ......................................................................................................8 
3.3 Principle Component Analysis .......................................................................................9 
4. Methodology ......................................................................................................................... 11 
4.1 Regression Analysis ..................................................................................................... 11 
4.1 Test of Reverse Causality ............................................................................................. 12 
4.2 Economic Significance ................................................................................................. 13 
5. Empirical Results .................................................................................................................. 14 
5.1 Full Sample Regressions .............................................................................................. 14 
5.2 Developed vs. Developing Countries ............................................................................ 15 
5.3 Regression by Category ................................................................................................ 15 
5.4 Results for Reverse Causality ....................................................................................... 17 
5.5 Contribution of Variables ............................................................................................. 17 
6. Conclusions ........................................................................................................................... 19 
References ................................................................................................................................ 21 
Appendix .................................................................................................................................. 23 
 1 
1. Introduction 
There have been numerous studies on financial crises, likely because of their large impact on the 
financial markets and the inherent difficulties in forecasting them.  This topic became even more 
popular after the sub-prime credit problems that started in the United States in 2007. The credit 
problems initially occurred in the U.S., but then grew rapidly into a problem that had a serious 
impact on the global financial sector.  
 
Regulations and governance always come after a crisis, thus many studies have focused on how a 
government responds after a crisis. However, to have an in-depth understanding of the original 
causes of a financial crisis, the lack of regulation needs to be explored as a crucial reason for this 
catastrophe’s extension to the financial market across the world.  
 
Every coin has two sides, and so does regulation. On one hand, there is literature arguing that 
better governance can enhance governments’ control on the market participants, and thus can 
protect the financial market from a financial crisis. On the other hand, the introduction of 
financial regulations always encourages participants to make financial innovations, which 
appears to be a good thing. However, such innovations are a way to bypass regulations, which 
can seriously damage the financial order during the crisis. Moreover, Moshirian (2011) argues 
that regulations can have negative effects on the financial market. He observes that, without a 
holistic global and inclusive framework, regulations would intensify the negative consequences 
of regulatory restrictions. 
 
This paper studies how existing regulations affect financial crises. In our research, we examine 
financial crises across 88 countries from 1996 to 2013. We not only test using the full sample, but 
also divide our sample set into developed countries and developing countries, and in consequence 
we got different results. To begin our research, we conduct a regression analysis. However before 
building our model, we conduct a principal component analysis to reduce the dimensions, as 
there are many variables shown by the literature that are causes of financial crises. We review 
these variables in the literature review section. We choose to include seven principal components 
in our regression analysis as in aggregate they conveys 83.3% of the information carried by our 
macroeconomic, political risk and information variables. Then, we conclude our findings by 
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comparing the contemporary regressions and lag regressions using crisis/GDP growth as the 
dependent variable and governance variables and principal components as independent variables. 
We further conduct regressions by region and by variable groups as robustness checks. We also 
verify our results by examining the economic significance of the variables. The results confirm 
that both the information variables and governance variables have a significant impact on 
financial crises. Note that we also determine whether there is a difference between the impacts of 
regulations on emerging and developed markets.  
 
We find that for a full sample test, the better the capability of a government to develop as well as 
implement policies and regulations which can facilitate private sector development the more 
likely a financial crisis occurs. Also, the higher the likely of political instability can increase the 
probability of a financial crisis. 
 
Our study contributes to several strands of financial research, which can be divided into three 
parts. First, we fill in the gap in the literature by showing how the country-level governance and 
regulation impact the probability of financial crises and the performance of a country during a 
crisis. Many studies explore the causes of financial crises and how the regulations change as a 
result of the crises. To the best of our knowledge, no study has examined our research question. 
Second, we include all major global financial crisis periods over two decades instead of only the 
recent global financial crisis. Third, this study analyzes the impacts of regulation on the 
probability of financial crises occurrences.  
 
The remains of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 gives the background and previous 
studies on its determinants for financial crises. Section 3 describes the data, including the 
introduction of both dependent and explanatory variables, and the results of the principal 
component analysis. Section 4 explains the regressions we conducted for the research. Section 5 
discusses the empirical results and their implications. Finally, Section 6 concludes. 
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2. Literature Review 
Previous literature has investigated what causes financial crises, such as financial globalization, 
the macro financial environment, structural causes, and so forth. The only research linking both 
financial crises and regulations together entirely focuses on the policy response to financial crises. 
There is no literature on how regulations or country-level governance affects financial crises; thus, 
we can only draw tentative conclusions through other related literature. Although researchers 
seldom examine the effect of country-level governance on financial crises, we find that numerous 
studies examine the relation between bank regulations and bank performance during financial 
crisis. We hypothesize that country-level governance and regulations may have a similar effect 
on the market performance as bank regulations have on bank performance during financial crisis 
periods.  
 
Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2004) study the relationship between bank regulatory practices and 
banking-sector development, efficiency, and stability. Examining hundreds of countries, they find 
that three major actions that can undermine financial stability are restricting bank activities or 
discouraging the diversification of income, putting limits on foreign bank ownership, and 
exacerbating moral hazard by means of generous deposit insurance scheme fragility. They also 
argue both strict requests on capital and regulation powers would not have an effect on banking 
crises when other regulatory policies are under control. Based on Barth et al.’s (2004) research, 
Caprio et al. (2010) extend the macro financial indicator as an explanatory variable and also 
extended the sample period so that they could take into account the long-term evolution of the 
financial industry. Their contribution is not only on analyzing the macro financial determinants of 
the Great Financial Crisis of 2007 to 2009, but also contributing to policymakers formulating 
laws and regulations to achieve a balance between financial stability and economic growth. 
Similar to Barth et al. (2004), Beltratti and Stulz (2009) investigate why some banks perform 
better during the credit crisis. Specifically, they assess whether bank performance is related to 
bank-level governance, country-level governance, and country-level regulation. Their sample 
starts from 2007, which includes the Great Depression period. They challenge the previous 
thought that poor governance was a major cause of banks’ poor performance. They find that 
regulation differences between banks across countries are uncorrelated with the performance of 
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banks during the crisis period. Only large banks from countries with more country-level 
restrictions on bank activities perform better.  
 
In general, there are two explanations for how bank regulations are related to bank performance 
during financial crises. First, a branch of the literature raises that bank governance may influence 
executives’ wiliness to take risks. For instance, Merton (1977) asserts that better governance 
leads to better performance during crises. They expect that with better governance, banks are 
likely to have set more controls on traders and executives, which would make them less likely to 
take risks. Thus these banks with better governance can perform better during a crisis since they 
have less exposure to risks. John, Litov, and Yeung (2008) find that banks with poor governance 
are likely to reduce the traders’ willingness to take risks, and as a result banks with better 
governance would like to take more risks, which in contrast with Merton (1977) and taking more 
risks would have led these banks poor performance during the crisis. Second, bank regulations 
can affect bank performance during a financial crisis in a simple and direct manner in that banks 
with better governance can always make wiser and better decisions and thus have better return, 
and thus can fight against financial crises. 
 
We also found some literatures investigating in how the corporate governance affects the 
financial crises. Simon et al. (1999) studies the causes of the Asian crisis from 1997 to 1998.  
Their results highlight the importance of the legal protection given creditors and minority 
shareholders, and the results argue that the effectiveness of protections for minority shareholders 
can explain the extent of exchange rate depreciation and stock market decline. Greenspan (1998) 
also argues that with inappropriate macroeconomic policy during the 1990a exacerbate the initial 
depreciation in 1997 
 
Researchers have concluded that financial integration is highly correlated with country-level 
governance and regulations. For instance, Kose et al. (2009) notes that financial integration and 
globalization can also promote the development of local financial markets and can improve 
country-level governance in particular. Thus, besides the literatures on bank regulations, we also 
look into research on how financial integration affects financial crises. Tobin (2000) also argues 
that the integration of financial assets is not the same as, for example, physical capital or land. 
 5 
Financial assets and debts are easier to globalize because of the development of modern 
technology. As the communication methods evolve, the financial markets can be borderless, and 
the transactions among several markets can be faster and easier. Such communication 
developments would lead to the most crucial barrier for financial globalization being national 
regulations and country governance. 
 
Previous literature (Bekaert and Harvey, 2003) has stressed that the more integrated the markets, 
the fewer risks the economy will take during a financial crisis. The theory is that open and 
integrated markets lead to a lower cost of capital, and therefore increased investment 
opportunities and public savings, as a result, will finally reduce the loss during a global financial 
crisis. Bekaert et al. (2014) also support this result that there is no direct indication that the most 
integrated countries suffer the most during a crisis. 
 
Berger and Pukthuanthong (2012) find that the more a country is exposed to a common global 
financial factor, the higher likelihood the economy will be sensitive toa global financial crisis will 
appear. Their theory is that if the markets are sharing common global financial factors, the 
negative shocks are easier to propagate the multiple markets at the same time. With a similar 
argument, Lehkonen (2014) also conclude that integration can make countries take fewer risks 
during global shocks, but the gains from integration were especially uncertain during global 




3. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
To explore the probability of the existence and extent of regulations related to financial crises, we 
build a broad global sample. After deleting all missing data, 88 countries remain in our sample 
set. In the next subsections, we provide the basic terminology and notations that are necessary to 
understand the subsequent results, the descriptive statistics of our sample, and the details and 
results for our principal component analysis. 
 
3.1 Data  
3.1.1 Financial Crisis 
As a direct method, we use a dummy variable “crisis,” which equals one when there was a crisis 
during the year and zero if there was not. The research period for our paper was from 1996 to 
2013. We set this research period due to the accessibility of the regulation variable, as the 
regulation data start from 1996. We include all global financial crises from 1996 to 2013. In total, 
three periods of financial crisis are discussed here. Regarding Lehkonen (2014), the first crisis is 
defined from October 1997 to December 1998, including both the Asian crisis and the collapse of 
long-term capital management (LTCM). The starting point is estimated according to the market 
crash of Hong Kong, and because the Asian crisis includes LTCM, we merely use a common 
name: Asian crisis and LTCM. The second period of crisis is from October 2000 to December 
2002, the Dot-com bubble. And the latest period estimated was the global financial crisis from 
2007 to 2009. Although the National Bureau of Economic Research defines the ending point of a 
financial crisis, the starting point of this global financial crisis differs. The beginning point of a 
global financial crisis can be defined according to the initial fall of the stock markets, which is on 
August 2007; it can also be defined due to the collapse of Lehman Brothers, which was in 
September 2008. We used the year 2007 as the starting point since it can fully include the crisis 
period.  
 
We also use the annual GDP growth rate as a proxy of country performance. It refers to annual 
growth in real GDP and can be obtained directly from the World Development Indicators (WDI) 
database of the World Bank. The GDP growth rate is based on local currency and is calculated 
without making deductions for the depreciation of assets or the degradation of natural resources. 
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3.1.2 Governance Measures  
It is reasonable that a quantitative proxy for county-level governance should reflect all processes 
of governing, which include the process of a government being selected and monitored, as well as 
the capability of a government to implement policies. According to this definition, we follow the 
measurement developed by Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2009), in which six dimensions are 
used to measure country-level governance: voice and accountability, political stability and 
absence of violence, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of 
corruption. A higher scores on the variable, the better the governance. The definition of each 
dimension can be found in Appendix A Variable Definitions. All six governance variables range 
from -2.5 to 2.5, with higher values indicating better governance.  
 
Our governance variables can reflect different aspects of country level governance. Voice and 
accountability measures a country’s citizens’ ability to select their government, to select a free 
media and their freedom of expression and association. Political stability and absence of violence 
terrorism measures the likelihood of political instability and politically motivated violence and 
terrorism. Government effectiveness refers to the quality of public services, civil service, the 
independence of government when making and implementing policy from political pressures, and 
the credibility of a government’s commitment. Rule of law measures the extent to which an agent 
abides by the regulations, specifically, the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the 
police, the courts, and the likelihood of crime and violence. Control of corruption measures the 
extent to which public power is exercised for private gain. Regulatory quality measures the 
capability of a government to develop as well as implement policies and regulations that can 
facilitate private sector development. 
 
We examine these dimensions separately and take the average of these six dimensions as the 
governance index (GI) as a whole. Governance variables can be accessed through Worldwide 
Governance Indicators (WGI) of the World Bank. 
 
3.1.3 Other Explanatory/ Control Variables 
To examine how regulations influence financial crises, we use the multivariate regression 
framework. We classify all the independent variables into four groups. The first group is country-
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level governance and the power of regulations, as discussed above. In this section, we discuss the 
rest of the variables, including political risk, domestic macroeconomic fundamental and risk 
appetite, and information variables.  
 
First, we control for political risk using the data from Heritage Foundation and Freedom House, 
which includes: freedom of the press, political rights, civil liberties, property rights, freedom 
from corruption, fiscal freedom, government spending, business freedom, monetary freedom, 
trade freedom, investment freedom, and financial freedom. Next, we control for factors 
previously shown to influence financial crises. These control variables include domestic credit to 
private, GNI per capita, unemployment, inflation, and current account balance. In addition, to 
control for the information frictions, we also include information variables, the number of 
telephone line subscribers per one hundred people, and the number of Internet users per hundred 
people. 
 
To save space, we do not present the definition and data source of other explanatory variables 
here, but they can be found in Appendix A. 
 
3.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Originally, we had 147 countries in our sample set, but after deleting all missing data, only 88 
countries were left in our sample. According to the United Nation, we can divide our sample into 
two groups, developed countries and developing countries. In general 28 countries from our 
sample are from developed countries, and the rest 60 countries are from developing countries. 
The list of countries can be found in Table II. 
 
Our data set includes the time period from 1996 to 2013. All variables were measured on an 
annual basis since most only has annually information. Three financial crisis periods are counted 
in our research, as discussed above.  
 
In total, we had 25 explanatory variables, in which, the governance variable is calculated by 
taking the average of the other six regulation variables. We choose all variables, excluding 
regulation variables, to conduct principal component analysis. Before conducting principal 
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component analysis, we test the multicollinearity of all variables used for the analysis, and the 
results showed that the VIF of every variable is lower than 10. 
 
*** Insert Table I here *** 
 
Table I provides descriptive statistics for the full sample. From the table, we can see that the 
variance for the gross national income (GNI) per capita (PPP method) is large, we assume this is 
normal since our research period is long, and our research targets are across the world. The 
maximum GNI is 99100, which happened in Kuwait in the year 2007, while the minimum GNI is 
Mozambique in 1996 and the value is 340. The GNI per capita was converted to U.S. dollars 
using the World Bank PPP method, divided by the midyear population. It is reasonable that the 
GNI per capita increases across time, thus although the range is large, so that we think there is no 
outlier for this variable.  
 
We compare the statistic descriptive in Table II. Median, mean and standard deviation are 
reported by developed and developing countries in this table, we also include a tt test to test the 
whether there is a statistic significant difference between the two sample.  From the result of the 
t- test, we can conclude that, except for inflation and crisis, all other variables are significantly 
different between the sub samples under 95% confidence level. 
 
*** Insert Table II here *** 
 
3.3 Principle Component Analysis 
To reduce the dimensions, we obtain a general combination of all political risk, domestic 
macroeconomic fundamental, and information variables to perform the principal component 
analysis. However, we exclude the regulation variables from the analysis since we put them 
separately in our regressions. We choose seven principal components as our explanatory 
variables, since these principal components can explain 83.3% of the information carried by the 
entire data set. The rotated component matrix can be found in Appendix B.  
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According to the rotated component matrix, we can find that PC1 and PC2 together can stand for 
the political risks. Political rights, civil liberties and freedom of the press all have a heavy load on 
PC1. All of these variables have more than 80% correlation with PC1. The three predictors 
correlate with PC1 with the correct sign. PC2 includes the rest political risk variables, respectively, 
they are financial freedom, investment freedom, business freedom, property rights, freedom from 
corruption, and monetary freedom. However, we can find a negative correlation between political 
rights civil liberties, freedom of the press and PC2. 
 
PC3 is a representative for information frictions, Internet users per hundred people (internet), and 
phone lines per hundred people (fixed phone) are all heavily positive correlated with it. So we 
can conclude that the PC3 is a control for the information frictions. 
 
PC4 and PC5 show the most significant correlation with domestic macroeconomic fundamentals. 
PC4 has a negative relationship with government spending and fiscal freedom. Current account 
and GNI have a heavily loads on PC5. It has a positive relationship with current account and GNI 
(PPP method). 
 
PC6 has a negative correlation with inflation, but a positive correlation with monetary freedom. 
According to the definition of the variables in Appendix A, monetary freedom represents the 
price stability and the power of price control by a country, and inflation stands for the general 
price level. Thus, although monetary freedom and inflation are from different categories, PC6 can 




4.1 Regression Analysis 
A conventional method to examine the relationship between financial crises and existing 
regulations is to conduct regression analyses. We use OLS regression analysis for the GDP 
regressions and logistic regression for the Crisis regressions since the dependent variable Crisis is 
a dummy variable. However, since we include 25 macroscopic variables in the regression, which 
is too many relative to our sample size, this consequently reduces the veracity of our model. 
Therefore, we need to reduce the dimensions before conducting regression analysis. The most 
common way to reduce the dimensions of the variables is to apply principal component analysis. 
Principal component analysis generates a set of values of linearly uncorrelated variables. 
According to principal component analysis, we choose the principals who can represent more 
than 80% of the information and thus we categorize all variables (excluding the regulation ones) 
into 7 principal components, which can explain 83.3% of all the data. The results of principal 
component analysis can be found in the data section (section 3). Our dependent variables for all 
regressions are either the dummy variable crisis or GDP growth. The dummy variable crisis 
equals 1 if there is a crisis, and 0 if there is no crisis for the year. The independent variables are 







where GDPt stands for the GDP growth rate at year t; crisis is the dummy variable when there is a 
crisis at year t it equals to 1, otherwise equals to 0; GIt stands for the governance index at year t, 
and can be separated into six components including VAt, GEt, PSt, RQt, CCt, and RLt, which 
stand for voice and accountability, government effectiveness, political stability and absence, 
regulatory quality, control of corruption, and rule of law at time t correspondingly. PCit stands for 
the principal components i at time t. (To save space, the abbreviations apply to the entire paper.) 
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Then to compare the effects of regulation factors at time t and at time t-1, we ran the full lag 
regression as well. For the lag regression, we do the same as the contemporary regressions but 
simply replace all data for the regulation variables (governance index, voice and accountability, 
government effectiveness, political stability and absence, regulatory quality, control of corruption, 
and rule of law) at year t with the data at year t-1; the dependent variables and principal 
components remained at year t. In addition, we conduct a regression by dividing the data into 
different economies, developed countries and developing countries.  
 
Note that we also compare the regressions with principal components and the regression 
including all variables individually. We pool variables into groups and run separate regressions 
with each set of variables. The categories are the same as those shown in the data definition: 
country governance, macro-environment, political risk, and information risk. The group country 
governance includes voice and accountability, political stability and absence, government 
effectiveness, regulatory quality, control of corruption, and rule of law; macro-environment 
contains current account, GNI (PPP method), inflation, and unemployment; political risk covers 
freedom of the press, political rights, civil liberties, property rights, freedom from corruption, 
fiscal freedom, government spending, business freedom, monetary freedom, trade freedom, 
investment freedom, and financial freedom; and fixed phone usage and internet usage constitute 
the group information risk. For the regulation variable group, we measure the independent 
variable at time t-1 and dependent variables at time t; and for the rest regression in Table V, we 
measure all the variables at time t. 
 
4.1 Test of Reverse Causality 
Besides investigate in how governance affect the probability of a financial crisis, we also test the 
reverse causality of the relationship between country level governance and financial crisis to 
improve the completeness of our research. Thus we conduct the following OLS regression, 
 
GIt=αCrisist-1+βitGDP Growtht-1+γ PCit-1ε, 
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where GI stands for the governance index, Crisis is a dummy variable, PC stands for the principal 
components. We measure the governance index at time t, and all the independent variables at 
time t-1.  
 
4.2 Economic Significance  
After we obtain the final model, we look for a better perspective through which to examine the 
effect the regulations have on financial crises. Thus we investigate the economic significance of 
the independent variables, and this technique to examine on the effects of each of the variables on 
the crises is even more interesting and straightforward. 
 
Following the method used by Bekaert et al. (2011) and Lehkonen (2015), the economic 
significance presents the changes in the dependent variable (financial crisis) when the 
independent variable moves one standard deviation from the average value for the entire market 
and regional markets. For all the variables, which experience only time-series variation, we 
examine their response to a one-standard deviation change. To determine the economic 
significance, we calculate the standard deviations for each of the explanatory variables and then 
multiplied the estimated coefficients calculated from the lag regressions; the larger the result, the 
greater contribution the variable made to the financial crisis. Using this method, we can conclude 
what contribute the most to the financial crises for both full sample and regional data.  
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5. Empirical Results 
We report the results from the regression analysis in Table III, Table IV, and Table V. Our 
modeling strategy was to first compare full sample contemporary regressions versus lag 
regressions in Section 5.1 to examine how country-level governance affects the probability of 
financial crises. We also interpret the empirical results by different economies in Section 5.2 and 
by category in Section 5.3, which can further explain how country-level governance can affect 
financial crises, or the performance of a country during a crisis period. In Section 5.4, we discuss 
the results of economic significance. 
 
5.1 Full Sample Regressions 
Table III shows the results for full sample regressions, of which Panel A reports the results of 
GDP growth regressions, while Panel B reports the results of logistic regressions. Theoretically, 
the coefficients for the crisis regressions and GDP growth regressions should have different 
opposite signs; however, the coefficients of the governance index for all contemporary 
regressions and lag regressions are positive. So we need to further examine how the breakdowns 
of governance variables affect financial crises, and consider the influencing factor of region, 
which we discuss in the following sections.  
 
*** Insert Table III here *** 
 
First, we review the results for contemporary regressions in Panel A. The coefficients for 
governance variables are not statistically and economically significant when the dependent 
variable is the dummy variable crisis. From the contemporary regressions in Panel A, we can find 
that the coefficients of PC3, PC5 and PC6 have a statistic significant negative effect on the 
dependent variable Crisis. PC3 stands for the information frictions, PC5 has a positive relation 
with gross nation income and current account and PC6 represents the price stability of a country.  
The second and forth columns of Panel B shows the results for lag regressions for the logistic 
regressions. From the lag regressions we can find that political stability, rule of law and absence 
and regulatory quality both have a statistic significant effects on crisis with coefficients 0.209, -
0.437 and 0.788. And governance index as a whole also has a significant positive effect on crisis 
with a coefficient 0.533. When the results are compared to the contemporary regressions, we find 
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that the coefficients of regulatory quality, and political stability and absence become more 
significant in the crisis lag regression. Panel D shows how the regulation affects country 
performance.  
 
5.2 Developed vs. Developing Countries 
In this part we reports the comparison between the effects of regulation on developing countries 
and developed countries.  
 
*** Insert Table IV here *** 
 
Panel A shows the effects of regulation on GDP growth, and in model I we use governance index 
as independent variable, while Model II use the breakdowns. From Panel A we can find that 
governance index as a whole both has a statistically positive effect on GDP growth. However, 
when we look into the breakdowns from Panel B, the plus-minus signs vary between developed 
countries and developing countries. The factor rule of law has a positive coefficient on GDP 
growth for developing countries with the coefficient 1.531, but negative effects on developed 
countries with a coefficient -2.906. 
 
Panel B reports the results of the effects of regulation have on financial crisis. From Panel B, we 
can see that governance index as a whole has a positive effect on crisis for both of the developed 
countries and developing countries. However, we can find that differences appear between 
different economies. Specifically, voice and accountability and rule of law have different effects. 
Voice and accountability has a positive effect on developing countries, but has a significant 
negative effect on developed countries at 5% significance level. Similarly, rule of law and 
regulatory quality also have different effects on different economies, they both have a negative 
effect on developing countries, and however a positive effects on developed countries. 
 
5.3 Regression by Category 
We interpret the results for regressions by category in this section. Each panel in Table V reports 
a different group.  
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Panel A reports the results for the regressions of country-level governance with all governance 
variables measure at time t-1 and dependent variables measure at time t. Similar to the 
contemporary regressions mentioned in Section 5.1, only political stability and absence have a 
significant positive effect on crisis at 5% confidence level, and the rest governance variables are 
not significant for the crisis regression. Looking into the GDP growth regression, we find that the 
voice and accountability, rule of law and regulatory quality have negative effects on GDP growth. 
However, government effectiveness has a positive effect with one unit increase in to result to 0.9 
units increase in GDP growth. 
 
In panel A we also investigate the relationship between the macro-environment and financial 
crisis. The plus and minus signs for GDP growth regression and crisis regression are opposite, 
which is in accordance with our expectation. Inflation and unemployment have a negative 
correlation with the financial situation, while current account, and GNI have a positive 
correlation with it. The coefficients of current account, gross national income, inflation, and 
unemployment are all significant at 99% confidence level.  
 
Panel C presents the relationship between financial crises and political risks. For the GDP growth 
regression, the coefficients of civil liberties, freedom from corruption, government spending and 
monetary freedom are positive and significant at a 99% confidence level. The coefficient of 
business freedom and political rights are significant as well, but negative. When the dependent 
variable is the dummy variable crisis, the results differ. Freedom of the press and fiscal freedom 
have a significantly inverse relationship with the dummy variable crisis, while civil liberties and 
governance spending have a positive association with crisis, but all these coefficients are 
significant. 
 
Panel D shows the effects of information frictions. We can tell from the table that all information 
risk variables are quite important factors for GDP growth and financial crises, as fixed phone 
usage and Internet users per hundred people are both significant for GDP growth and crisis 
regressions under the significance level 99.9%. Thus we can interpret that the more fixed phone 
users per hundred people, the worse effect on the GDP growth, and more likely there is a 
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financial crisis. However, for the Internet users per hundred people, when there is one unit 
increase, there is 0.036 units decrease in the chance of financial crisis. 
 
 *** Insert Table V here ***  
 
5.4 Results for Reverse Causality 
We report the results of reverse causality in Table VI. In the table, we use governance index as 
dependent variables, and crisis dummy, GDP growth and principal components as independent 
variables. As of we are trying to investigate whether the crisis as a reverse causality effects on 
country level governance, we measure the dependent variable at time t and all independent 
variables at time t-1. 
 
We found that all the independent variables from the past year have a statistical significant effect 
on the country level governance in the following year at 99% confidence level. From Table VI, 
we found that GDP growth and crisis dummy both have a positive effects on governance index, 
so do PC2, PC3, PC4, PC5 and PC6. However, PC1 and PC7 have negative effects on the 
governance, from the results for principal component analysis, we can know that PC1 stands for 
political risks (Political rights, civil liberties and freedom of the press), PC7 stands for the 
unemployment rate.  
 
*** Insert Table VI here *** 
 
5.5 Contribution of Variables 
In this section, we report the contribution of each variable. In particular, we examine the response 
to a one standard deviation change. Table VII presents the economic significance of the annual 
variables. It shows the contributions each of the explanatory variables made to a one-standard 
deviation movement of a financial crisis. In Table VII columns I, II and III refer to full sample, 
developed countries and developing countries, respectively. 
 
From the first column, we can find that voice and accountability, regulatory quality, rule of law, 
and Internet users per hundred people are the most important factors to the financial crisis. 
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Among them, an increase of the score of rule of law will increase the probability of the 
occurrence of financial crisis. 
 
For the developed countries, we can conclude that voice and accountability, government 
effectiveness, regulatory quality, control of corruption, freedom of the press, inflation and 
internet contributes the most to the financial crisis. However, for the developing countries, rule of 
law and internet usage contributes the most. From column II and III, we can compare the 
different effects the regulation variables have on the probability of a financial crisis. Government 
effectiveness and regulatory quality show the different effects. 
 
*** Insert Table VII here ***  
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6. Conclusions 
This paper examines the important yet understudied topic of financial crises and how they 
affected by country-level governance and regulations. We find that the quality of regulation 
enforcement, political stability and absence of violence/terrorism are the most important factors. 
 
Previous researchers have studied which factors cause a financial crisis and have also 
investigated the regulation responses in the aftermath of the recent global financial crisis. Only a 
few of previous literature, however, have focused on how regulations or country-level 
governance affect the occurrence of a financial crisis. 
 
We apply the governance index and its breakdowns created by Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 
(2009) and conduct both contemporary regression and lag regression analyses. We also control 
for political risk, the macro financial environment, and information variables when estimating our 
multivariate regressions to allow for the relationship between governance and financial crises to 
be better understood. To determine how the impact of governance on crises differs in various 
financial markets, we conduct a regional analysis. We also examine the economic significance of 
our explanatory variables following methods used in Bekaert et al. (2011) and Lehkonen (2015). 
 
Using a sample of 88 countries from 1996 to 2013, we conduct a regression analysis and find that 
governance has a positive effect on GDP growth and also on the occurrence of crises. To further 
explore this surprising relationship, we conduce a regression analysis to compare the effects of 
regulation on developed and developing countries.  
 
We conclude that political stability and the absence of violence/terrorism and regulatory quality 
are more important factors than other aspects of country-level governance.  With higher scores in 
regulatory quality, the probability of financial crises tends to decrease and GDP growth tends to 
increase. What’s more, a more stable political environment can reduce the probability of financial 
crisis and increase GDP growth. 
 
However, GDP growth cannot fully represents financial crisis. Since there are lots of indicators 
for a financial crisis, such as oil price, stock price index or nominal exchange rate, no indicators 
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itself can act as a proxy for financial crisis, while using GDP growth can help us understand the 
effects of country governance and it can also be used as a proxy of country performance. 
 
In addition to country-level governance, information risk also plays a significant role in financial 
markets. Based on our empirical results, we conclude that with better communication methods, in 
other words, with less information friction, we can protect the GDP growth rate during financial 
crisis periods and can directly reduce the probability of financial crises as well.  
 
However, there are several areas we can focus on in further research that are not related in a study 
of global financial crises; thus, further studies should focus on regional crises, such as the Euro 
zone sovereign debt crisis that happened around the end of 2009 or Asia’s financial crisis in 1997; 
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Appendix A: Variable Definitions 
 
Variable Source Definition 
   
Crisis Periods Lehkonen (2014) Asian financial crisis and LTCM: 10/1997–12/1998. 
Dot-com bubble: 10/2000–12/2002. 
Global financial crisis: 8/2007–6/2009 and 9/2008–6/2009. 
   
GDP Growth (annual %) WDI GDP growth rate measured at market prices based on local 
currency, calculated yearly. 
   
Country Governance and Power of Regulations 
   
Voice and Accountability 
 
WDI Voice and accountability measures a country’s citizens’ 
ability to select their government, their freedom of 
expression and association, and to select free media. 
   
Political Stability and 
Absence of 
Violence/Terrorism 
WDI Political stability and absence of violence/terrorism 
measures the likelihood of political instability and 
politically motivated violence and terrorism. 
   
Government Effectiveness 
 
WDI Government effectiveness refers to the quality of public 
services, civil service, the independence of government 
when making and implementing policy from political 
pressures, and the credibility of a government’s 
commitment. 
   
Rule of Law 
 
WDI Rule of law measures the extent to which an agent abides 
by the regulations—specifically, the quality of contract 
enforcement, property rights, the police, the courts, and the 
likelihood of crime and violence. 
   
Control of Corruption 
 
WDI Control of corruption measures the extent to which public 
power is exercised for private gain. 
   
Regulatory Quality 
 
WDI Regulatory quality measures the capability of a government 
to develop as well as implement policies and regulations 
that can facilitate private sector development. 
Governance Index (Average) 
 
 WDI The average of governance indicators used by Kaufmann, 
Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2009): voice and accountability, 
political stability and absence, government effectiveness, 
the rule of law, control of corruption, and regulatory 
quality. 
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Political Risk 
   
Freedom of the Press Freedom House Freedom of the press measures the degree of freedom to 
which new agencies exercise their power in each country, 
and the extent to which the government respects their 
freedom. 
   
Political Rights 
 
Freedom House Political rights represent the degree of freedom of people 
participating in the political process. 
     
Civil Liberties Freedom House Civil liberties measure the freedoms of an individual’s 
expression and belief, associational and organizational 
rights, rule of law, and self-rule without disturbance from 
the state. 
  
   
Property Rights Heritage Foundation Property rights measure the ability of individuals to 
accumulate private property and wealth. 
   
Freedom from Corruption 
 
Heritage Foundation Freedom from corruption measures the level of perceived 
corruption. Mainly derived from the CPI. 
   
Fiscal Freedom 
 
Heritage Foundation Fiscal freedom measures the freedom given by the 
government to individuals and enterprise to keep, manage, 
use, and benefit their own wealth and income. 
   
Government Spending Heritage Foundation Government spending refers to all government 
consumption, investment, and transfer payments as a 
percentage of GDP. 
   
Business freedom Heritage Foundation Business freedom measures the extent of freedom from 
interference from the state when an individual establishes 
and runs a company. 
   
Monetary Freedom Heritage Foundation Monetary freedom measures the price stability as well as 
the power of price control in a country. 
   
Trade Freedom Heritage Foundation Trade freedom measures not only the economy’s openness 
to the inflow and outflow of goods and services around the 
world, but also the ability of a citizen to act as a buyer and a 
seller in the international market. 
   
Investment Freedom Heritage Foundation Investment freedom measures the freedom of investment, 
ie. it evaluates the restrictions imposed on investment. 
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Financial Freedom Heritage Foundation Financial freedom is a measurement of banking efficiency 
and independence from both government and financial 
sectors. 
   
Domestic Macroeconomic Fundamentals and Risk Appetite 
   
Domestic Credit to the Private 
Sector (% of GDP) 
 
WDI Domestic credit to the private sector represents the financial 
resources provided to the private sector by financial 
enterprises. 
   
GNI per Capita (PPP Method) WDI GNI per capita ppp is the gross national income divided by 
the midyear population, using the World Bank’s PPP 
method to convert to U.S. dollars.  
   
Unemployment Heritage 
Foundation/IMF 
The unemployment rate refers to the total unemployment 
over the total labor force. 
   
Inflation (Consumer Prices 
annual %) 
WDI Inflation is measured based on the consumer price index 
(CPI).  
   
Current Account Balance 
 
IMF Current account balance is the sum of net exports of goods 
and services, net primary income, and secondary income. 
Data are denoted in U.S dollars. 
   
Information Friction 
 
Phone Lines per 
100 People 
WDI Number of fixed lines and mobile phone subscribers per 
100 people. 
   
Internet Users 
per 100 People 
WDI Number of internet users per 100 people. 
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Appendix B: Principal Component Analysis 
 
This table reports the result for principal component analysis. We report the rotated component matrix of our control variables, 
including political risk variable, macroeconomic fundamental variables and information friction variables. All variables used to 
extract principal components are measured in year t. The numbers represent the correlation between each variable used in the 
principal component and the principal component itself. It shows how much each variable influences each principal component.  
Rotated Component Matrix 
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Internet Users 
-0.225 0.286 0.720 0.201 0.244 0.111   







      













Fixed Line Users 
-0.362 0.350 0.483 0.549 0.197     
Current Account 
        
0.957 
 
    
GNI (PPP Method) -0.124 0.348 0.564 0.254 0.582   -0.134 
 

















    -0.106       0.960 
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Table I: Descriptive Statistics 
 
In this table, we report the descriptive statistic for the full sample. We state the minimum, maximum, mean, median and standard 
deviation of our dependent variable as well as independent variables. 
  Minimum Maximum Mean Median Std. Deviation 
Business Freedom   28.8 100.0 68.1  70.0 
 
13.6 
Civil Liberties   1.0 7.0 2.9  3.0 1.5 
Control of Corruption  -1.4 2.6 0.2 -0.14 1.0 
Current Account  -42.3 45.2 -1.1 -2.0 8.3 
Financial Freedom   20.0 90.0 56.4  50.0 16.6 
Fiscal Freedom   29.8 99.9 70.9  73.0 14.6 
Fixed Line Users  0.2 74.8 22.6  16.3 20.0 
Freedom from Corruption   10.0 100.0 46.0  38.0 23.2 
Freedom of the Press   5.0 99.0 40.7  40.0 20.8 
Governance Index -1.2 2.0 0.2  0.0 0.8 
Government Effectiveness  -1.3 2.4 0.3  0.0 0.9 
Government Spending   0.0 99.3 64.3 71.4 24.6 
Inflation -8.5 1058.4 6.9  3.7 28.6 
Internet Users 0.0 95.1 23.8  11.2 26.5 
Investment Freedom 5.0 95.0 58.3  60.0 17.5 
Monetary Freedom 0.0 94.3 75.2  77.7 13.1 
Political Rights 1.0 7.0 2.8  2.0 1.8 
Political Stability and Absence of 
Violence/Terrorism 
-2.4 1.7 0.0  0.1 0.9 
GNI (PPP Method) 340.0 99100.0 15785.4 9395.0 15903.7 
Property Rights 10.0 95.0 54.9  50.0 21.9 
Regulatory Quality -1.3 2.2 0.4  0.2 0.8 
Rule of Law -1.5 2.1 0.2 -0.1 0.9 
Trade Freedom 0.0 90.0 71.1  74.2 13.7 
Unemployment   0.7 35.9 8.4  7.2 5.4 
Voice and Accountability -1.9 1.8 0.2  0.1 0.9 
GDP Growth (%) -14.8 17.3 3.8  3.8 3.6 
No. of Observations 1548 1548 1548 1548 1548 
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Table II:  Summary Statistics for Developed vs. Developing Countries 
 
This table reports descriptive statistics for our subsamples of developed and developing countries. Column I and II report for the tests for mean and median of developed vs. 
developing countries. Column I reports the p-value of the t-test on mean and column II reports the p-value for Wilcoxon median tests. The list of developed countries and 
developing countries can be found at the end of the table. 


















Business Freedom 78.3 77.4 11.1 63.4 62.4 12.0 0.000 0.000 
Civil Liberties 1.3 1.0 0.5 3.6 4.0 1.2 0.000 0.000 
Control of Corruption 1.3 1.4 0.8 -0.3 -0.4 0.6 0.000 0.000 
Current Account -0.2 -0.8 6.0 -1.5 -2.7 9.2 0.000 0.000 
Financial Freedom 67.6 70.0 15.1 51.2 50.0 14.5 0.000 0.000 
Fiscal Freedom 58.3 61.0 13.2 76.7 77.7 11.2 0.000 0.000 
Fixed Line Users 46.6 47.6 13.1 11.7 9.7 11.0 0.000 0.000 
Freedom from Corruption 69.1 73.0 20.4 35.5 32.0 15.5 0.000 0.000 
Freedom of the Press 19.0 18.0 8.7 50.6 52.0 16.8 0.000 0.000 
Governance Index 1.2 1.6 0.5 -0.2 -0.2 0.5 0.000 0.000 
Government Effectiveness 1.3 40.3 0.6 -0.2 80.1 0.6 0.000 0.000 
Government Spending 37.7 2.3 18.6 76.5 5.0 15.7 0.000 0.000 
Inflation 6.0 52.0 48.9 7.4 6.1 9.8 0.457 0.000 
Internet Users 47.0 70.0 28.4 13.2 50.0 17.2 0.000 0.000 
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Investment Freedom 69.9 82.1 12.5 53.0 75.7 16.8 0.000 0.000 
Monetary Freedom 80.2 1.0 10.9 72.9 3.0 13.4 0.000 0.000 
Political Rights 1.1 1.0 0.3 3.6 -0.3 1.7 0.000 0.000 
Political Stability And Absence 
of Violence/Terrorism 
0.9 28640.0 0.4 -0.4 6160.0 0.7 0.000 0.000 
GNI (PPP Method) 29144.9 90.0 12003.6 9671.7 50.0 13555.6 0.000 0.000 
Property Rights 76.5 1.3 17.3 45.1 -0.2 16.0 0.000 0.000 
Regulatory Quality 1.3 1.4 0.4 -0.1 -0.4 0.5 0.000 0.000 
Rule of Law 1.3 81.4 0.6 -0.3 69.7 0.5 0.000 0.000 
Trade Freedom 80.4 7.0 7.1 66.9 7.4 13.9 0.000 0.000 
Unemployment 7.7 1.3 3.8 8.7 -0.2 6.0 0.000 0.000 
Voice and Accountability 1.2 2.4 0.3 -0.2 4.7 0.6 0.000 0.000 
GDP Growth 2.2 77.4 2.9 4.5 62.4 3.7 0.000 0.000 
No. of Observations 486 486 486 1062 1062 1062   
 
List of developed countries: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary,  Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, 
Malta, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States. 
List of developing countries: Albania, Algeria, Armenia, Bahrain, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Burkina Faso, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Dominican Republic, 
Ecuador, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Georgia, Ghana, Guatemala, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Israel, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mali, Mexico, 
Moldova, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Niger, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Saudi, Arabia, Senegal, Singapore, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Suriname, Swaziland, Tanzania, 
Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, Uruguay, Vietnam, Zambia. 
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Table III:  The Effect of Country Governance on Financial Crises 
 
This table examines the effect of regulations on financial crises using a contemporary and lagged regression setup. In the 
contemporary regressions, all variables are measured in year t; in the lagged regressions, all governance variables are measured in 
year t-1, while other control variables (macroeconomic, political risk and information variables) and dependent variables (GDP 
growth and crisis dummy) are measured in year t. In panel A, the dependent variable is the GDP growth of country i in year t. In 
Panel B, the dependent variable is a dummy variable that measures the occurrence of a financial crisis of country i in year t. The 
crisis dummy equals 1 when there is a crisis, and 0 otherwise. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, 
respectively. 
 











Panel A: GDP growth regression 
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Political Stability and Absence 





















































































































































Panel B: Crisis regression 
 
Voice and Accountability 







Political Stability and Absence 

























































































































Chi-square 65.550  141.960  71.856  153.459 
(p-value) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Pseudo R
2
  0.056  0.124  0.061  0.133 




Table IV: The Effects of Country Governance in Developed vs. Developing Countries 
 
 
This table compares the effects of country governance on different types of economies, i.e. developed and developing countries. 
Panel A reports for OLS regressions in which the dependent variable is GDP growth, and Panel B presents results for logistic 
regressions in which the dependent variable is crisis dummy. We measure the regulation variables at time t-1 while all other 
independent variables and dependent variables are measured at time t. In model I, we use the governance index to represent 
country governance, while in model II, we use the underlying factors of the governance index as proxies of country governance, ie. 
voice and accountability, political stability and absence of violence/terrorism, government effectiveness, rule of law, regulatory 
quality, and control of corruption.  *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 










Panel A: GDP growth regression 
 






















































































































































No. of Observations   459  459  1003  1003 










Panel B: Crisis regression 
 











































































































































Chi-square  76.303  81.297  89.012  97.914 
(p-value) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Pseudo R
2
  0.204  0.217   0.113  0.124 




Table V: Regressions by Variable Category 
 
This table reports regressions by variable category, namely country governance, macro-environment, political risk, and 
information risk variables. All dependent and independent variables are measured at year t. Panel A reports the group of country 
governance, Panel B states the group macro-economic variables, Panel C states the group of political risk variables, and Panel D 
states the group of information variables. We report both standardized and unstandardized coefficients. *, **, and *** indicate 




















































 / Pseudo R
2
  0.077  0.005 
F- Statistic / Chi-square 21.193  5.870 
(P-value) (0.000) (0.438) 




































 / Pseudo R
2
  0.073 0.020 
F- Statistic/ Chi-square  31.486 21.655 
(P-value) (0.000) (0.000) 





















































































 / Pseudo R
2
  0.123 0.104 
F- Statistic / Chi-square  19.080 118.504 
(P-value) (0.000) (0.000) 

























 / Pseudo R
2
  0.089 0.135 
F- Statistic / Chi-square  76.961 155.554 
(p-value)  (0.000) (0.000) 
No. of Observations 1462 1462 
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Table VI: Reverse Causality Test 
 
Table VI reports the results for a reverse causality test. The dependent variable in the reverse causality regression is the 
governance index measured at time t, whereas all independent variables, i.e., GDP growth, the crisis dummy and the principal 
components are measured at time t-1. We report both standardized coefficients and unstandardized coefficients for each 











 0.014 *** 
(0.000) 
 




 0.047 *** 
(0.000) 










 0.425 *** 
(0.000) 




 0.306 *** 
(0.000) 




 0.413 *** 
(0.000) 




 0.208 *** 
(0.000) 




 0.079 *** 
(0.000) 


















F- Statistic  
(p-value) 




Table VII: Contribution of Variables 
 
Columns I, II and III refer to the full sample, developed countries, and developing countries respectively. We report the effect of 
each integration variable on the dummy variable crisis when it experiences a one standard deviation change. 
 
I II III 
Voice and Accountability -0.468 -1.379 -0.139 








Government Effectiveness  0.243 -0.858  0.345 
Rule of Law -0.465  0.218 -0.313 
Regulatory Quality  0.506  0.713  0.279 
Control of Corruption -0.226  0.698 -0.233 
Current Account -0.109 -0.144 -0.116 
Freedom of the Press  -0.523 -0.969 -0.275 
Political Rights  -0.094 -0.361  0.004 
Civil Liberties   0.351  0.339  0.244 
Property Rights  0.260 -0.230  0.207 
Freedom from Corruption  0.296  0.267  0.065 
Fiscal Freedom -0.299 -0.478 -0.174 
Government Spending  0.241  0.103  0.177 
Business Freedom  0.145  0.126  0.078 
Monetary Freedom -0.247 -0.379 -0.298 
Trade Freedom  0.023  0.707 -0.036 
Investment Freedom -0.035 -0.277  0.038 
Financial Freedom -0.082  0.061 -0.096 
GNI (PPP Method)  0.194  0.097  0.289 
Inflation  0.455  3.948  0.069 
Unemployment -0.097 -0.296 -0.046 
Fixed Line Users  0.280  0.176  0.242 
Internet Users -1.055 -1.308 -0.888 
No. of Observations  1462  459  1003 
 
 
 
